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BETWEEN COURTESY AND CONSTANCY: 
THE FAERIE QUEENE, BOOKS 6 AND 7
BY ALEX DAVIS
Toward the end of book 6 of Edmund Spenser’s Faerie Queene, 
Calidore, the knight of courtesy, finds himself in a community of 
shepherds. There he falls in love with the beautiful Pastorella and 
begins to think about abandoning his quest for the Blatant Beast. 
In conversation with Pastorella’s father, the aged Meliboe, Calidore 
denounces “Lordship and ambition,” praises the rural lifestyle, and 
wishes that “th’heauens so much had graced mee, / As graunt me liue 
in like condition.”1 Meliboe is unimpressed by these wistful yearnings 
for a simpler existence. “Fittest is,” he declares, “that all contented 
rest / With that they hold” (6.9.29.8–9):
It is the mynd, that maketh good or ill,
That maketh wretch or happie, rich or poore:
For some, that hath abundance at his will,
Hath not enough, but wants in greatest store;
And other, that hath little, askes no more,
But in that little is both rich and wise.
For wisedome is most riches; fooles therefore
They are, which fortunes doe by vowes deuize,
Sith each vnto himself his life may fortunize.
           (6.9.30.1–9)
Fortune cannot touch the wise. Who seeks to alter his circumstances? 
Only a fool. Meliboe speaks generally, but the implication is stingingly 
personal.
Meliboe praises the “minds vnmoued quiet” (6.9.22.7). Later, 
Pastorella is said to display a “constant mynd” in adversity (6.11.5.2). 
This essay argues that Meliboe might be understood as a representa-
tive of the principle of constancy, and that his debate with Calidore 
might therefore offer an inset model of the relationship between 
book 6 of The Faerie Queene and book 7 as a projected “Legend of 
Constancie” (7.6.title). That seventh book is lost or unwritten, barring 
the fragmentary Two Cantos of Mutabilitie printed in 1609, whose 
relation to the rest of the poem is uncertain. In what follows, I exploit 
the presence of Meliboe in book 6 and the associations of constancy in 
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late sixteenth-century England to argue for a buried logic in Spenser’s 
move from courtesy towards a completed seventh book of constancy. 
In this passage between virtue and virtue, Meliboe performs a key 
structural function. He opens to view deficiencies inherent in the 
courteous disposition, as with his rebuke to the wavering Calidore. 
At the same time, he stands as a profoundly compromised exemplar 
of the virtue to come. Meliboe, I argue, represents constancy in its 
Stoic or Neostoic mode, which Spenser subjects to probing scrutiny. 
The dialogue of book 6, canto 9 homes in upon the articulation of 
the Stoic worldview through a language of property with which it is 
logically incompatible. Meliboe affects stern indifference to external 
circumstances, “rich or poore.” Yet his role in the dialogue is that of 
a celebrant of the satisfactions of rural life, in comparison to those 
offered by the court. The suggestion is that Meliboe’s insistence upon 
the unassailable autonomy of the constant mind is not to be taken at 
face value. Throughout this episode, Stoic subjectivity is presented 
as a psychic structure of striking rigidity, shot through with barely-
concealed anxieties concerning dispossession and loss.
Spenser’s poem thus moves towards a projected book 7 by staging 
a collapse of values. Neither constancy nor courtesy emerges from 
the encounter between Calidore and Meliboe unscathed. This double 
logic of negation goes some way towards explaining why the project 
of The Mutabilitie Cantos should be (as Linda Gregerson has recently 
emphasized) to set constancy into motion and to come to a reckoning 
with its apparent opposite, Mutabilitie, rather than simply rejecting 
her.2 Picking up on the discourse of property and possession first 
highlighted in the pastoral dialogue, The Mutabilitie Cantos under-
stand constancy as, at root, a question of inheritance, framed within a 
structure of returns to earlier forms of existence. The Cantos sift their 
past in search of the transformative formulation buried in the poem’s 
history that can dismantle false forms of constancy and unlock a form 
of the virtue capable of accommodating temporality and change.
* * * * * * *
As Judith H. Anderson has shown, Meliboe’s speech is a tissue of 
commonplaces, maxims so widely circulated in medieval and early 
modern culture as to have become virtually anonymous.3 Yet the 
1590s were a period when many of these thoughts had acquired a new, 
contemporary urgency and were being marketed as a recognizable body 
of doctrine. Meliboe speaks in the accents of late sixteenth-century 
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Neostoicism. Throughout this period, a host of publications reprinted 
Stoic writers such as Seneca, commented on their writing, and offered 
their own reworkings of Stoic thought in the light of Christian theology 
and contemporary political circumstances. Meliboe’s fundamental 
conceptual opposition between the self and a hostile external envi-
ronment is characteristic of this body of work, as is the notion that 
the constant mind might, through inner discipline, render itself indif-
ferent to worldly strife. Seneca’s second epistle comments (in Thomas 
Lodge’s translation) that “the desire of transporting thy selfe from one 
place vnto another . . . is but the tossing of a sicke minde.” “In my 
iudgement,” it continues, “the chiefest testimonie of a well composed 
minde, is to be able to consist and dwell with her selfe.”4 Meliboe’s 
first thought quoted above follows Seneca’s De vita beata particularly 
closely. “We cal him a blessed man,” Seneca writes, “who esteemeth 
nothing eyther good or euil, except a mind eyther good or euill.” The 
wise man “contenteth himself which hee possesseth, neyther desireth 
any more than hee hath at home.”5
The period during which Spenser composed and revised The 
Faerie Queene was one in which these thoughts came to seem of vital 
relevance to English readers. Justus Lipsius’s treatise De constantia was 
printed in London in 1586, only two years after its first publication in 
Leiden. It was reprinted in 1592 and translated into English by John 
Stradling in 1594 under the title Two bookes of constancie; the transla-
tion was quickly reissued in 1595 and again in 1596. Lipsius’s letters 
were printed in London in 1586, 1590, and 1593. His Politicorum 
was printed in 1590, and translated in 1594. In 1596, Thomas Nashe 
mocked Richard Harvey’s desire to be celebrated as “another” (not, 
note, “an”) “English Lipsius”: a sure sign of Neostoicism’s modish-
ness.6 Other publications from this period testify to English interest 
in Stoic and Neostoic thought. Guillaume du Vair’s study of The moral 
philosophie of the Stoicks was translated in 1598, and his 1589 treatise 
De la constance et consolation in 1622 was translated as A Buckler 
Against Adversitie and subtitled A Treatise of Constancie. Spenser 
himself has minor biographical connections to two key figures in 
this English Neostoic moment. He wrote a dedicatory sonnet to the 
courtesy book Nennio, translated by William Jones, who Englished 
Lipsius’s Politicorum.7 Meanwhile, John Stradling, the translator of 
the De constantia, composed a Latin epitaph for Spenser, “concerning 
some manuscript copies of his, burned by the Irish outlaws in the 
Irish rebellion”—the first reference, in fact, to the possible existence 
of lost Spenserian papers.8 (Lodge’s translation of Seneca’s complete 
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philosophical Workes appeared in 1614, long after Spenser’s death. 
Both men, however, attended the Merchant Taylors’ School in London 
during the headship of Richard Mulcaster.)
As philosophy, Neostoicism was largely conventional. Few of 
Lipsius’s recommendations differ sharply from anything we might find 
in a text such as Geoffrey Chaucer’s Boece (an earlier conduit for Stoic 
thought, and itself an influence on Spenser: this translation of Boethius 
appears in early modern editions of Chaucer). The achievement of 
Lipsius was instead to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of old 
thoughts. His De constantia explicitly frames its philosophical discussion 
in the context of civil war in the Netherlands. The text is a dialogue 
between Lipsius and his friend Carolus Langius, at the start of which 
Lipsius bewails the state of his native country. “Wee are tossed,” he 
cries, “these manie yeares with the tempest of ciuill warres: and like 
Sea-faring men are wee beaten with sundrie blastes of troubles and 
sedition.”9 Similarly, Du Vair’s Traité de la constance et consolation ès 
calamites is set during the siege of Paris in 1589. The image of disaster 
at sea recurs when the narrator describes himself caught within “this 
boysterous storme of worse than Ciuill Warres . . . at the Eue of a 
great shipwracke.”10 Neostoicism purported to offer a lifeline to early 
modern subjects overwhelmed by the turbulent waters of confessional 
warfare, internecine violence, incessant change and uncertainty.11
When, ten years after Spenser’s death, Matthew Lownes issued his 
1609 edition of The Faerie Queene, he suggested that the “Two Cantos 
of Mutabilitie,” printed for the very first time, “both for Forme and 
Matter, appeare to be parcell of some following Booke of the Faerie 
Qveene, vnder the Legend of Constancie” (7.6.title). There is no way, 
I suggest, that such a volume could have had nothing whatsoever to 
do with the various other books of constancy appearing in London 
booksellers throughout this period, even if its aim was to reject or 
fundamentally modify their terms of reference. It is true that the status 
of The Mutabilitie Cantos has been the subject of extensive scholarly 
debate. Northrop Frye, for instance, forcefully argued that they are not 
a fragment but instead “constitute a single, beautifully shaped poem 
that could not have had a more logical beginning, development, and 
end.”12 The case for a continuation is indeed not absolutely water-
tight. Various arguments have been made: Lownes’s use of the word 
“appeare” and his qualifier “some following Booke” (emphasis added) 
might be thought to imply a trace of uncertainty about his claims for 
the Mutabilitie Cantos; a knight of Constancy never appears in them; 
and the Cantos are more substantial than any comparable allegorical 
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inset, such as the account of the Garden of Adonis in book 3. Yet 
the format of the poem is congruent with the existing parts of The 
Faerie Queene; the four-line ballad stanzas introducing each canto, 
for instance, seem unlikely to belong to other composition. Beyond 
that, though, arguments against the idea of a projected “Legend of 
Constancy” tend to invoke aesthetic criteria that are fully implicated in 
the action of the poem itself, and in book 6 and The Mutabilitie Cantos 
in particular. Boundedness, shapeliness, a desire for fixity and comple-
tion: Frye’s terms are precisely those put into question in Spenser’s 
narrative. Arguments against The Mutability Cantos as the “parcel” 
of a seventh book of the poem on the grounds that (for example) no 
previous allegorical episode is so sustained treat The Faerie Queene 
as a mere template, possessed of a machinic regularity. They banish 
from the poem precisely that possibility for alteration and change that 
The Mutabilitie Cantos aim to explore.
I proceed, therefore, on the assumption that the plan for a seventh 
book of The Faerie Queene, whether incomplete or lost, has to be 
viewed as a fully viable possibility. And if Calidore represents the 
virtue of courtesy, while Meliboe speaks in the accents of a fashion-
able late-sixteenth-century Neostoicism, then their debate plausibly 
models the relationship between book 6 of The Faerie Queene and its 
successor volume. It allows us to begin to think through what might 
be involved in any transition from courtesy to constancy. Spenser often 
has his principals interact in this way. When Redcrosse fights Guyon 
(see 2.1.26–30), or Guyon Britomart (see 3.1.4–12), these encounters 
tell us something about the internal articulation of his poem: that 
Holiness endorses the efforts of Temperance, for instance, or that 
Chastity outweighs it. As the poem progresses, these moments are 
increasingly anticipatory. Artegall’s emergence as a central character 
is trailed throughout books 3 and 4, whilst the Blatant Beast, the key 
antagonist of book 6, makes its first appearance at the end of the 
preceding volume. So too, I argue, with the dialogue between Calidore 
and Meliboe. A number of scholars have raised the possibility that a 
completed book 7 would have been meant to engage with Lipsian 
constancy. At the same time, it has proven hard to do much with this 
idea. The most detailed account of The Mutabilitie Cantos in the 
light of Neostoic thinking to date, by Christopher Burlinson, finds as 
many differences as it does points of contact. (For example: “Senecan 
constancy is no metaphysical or cosmic principle of unchangingness [as 
in Spenser, it is argued], but a response, a reasoning response to the 
vicissitudes of the world.”)13 Attending to the appearance of Meliboe 
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in book 6 can, I argue, clarify this pattern of partial engagement. It 
shows the movement towards a “Legend of Constancie” being prepared 
for through a detailed but often unsympathetic scrutiny of constancy 
in its Neostoic aspect.
* * * * * * *
The connection between book 6 and The Mutabilitie Cantos is situ-
ational as well as thematic. In the pastoral dialogue, Calidore functions 
as a kind of reverse Mutabilitie, wishing not to aspire but rather “that 
my fortunes might transposed bee / From pitch of higher place, vnto 
this low degree” (6.9.28.8–9). In each case, the desire for a change in 
status is rebuffed by a voice of constancy.14 Famously, book 6, canto 
9 represents a moment when something seems to have gone wrong 
with the virtue of courtesy. Calidore abandons his quest for the Blatant 
Beast; he seeks to downsize his lifestyle; he chases after a shepherdess. 
Courtesy, here, reaches its crisis point. Yet the voice of the “vnmoved,” 
constant rigor that resists Calidore’s truancy is not therefore positioned 
as the simple alternative to a discredited virtue (6.9.22.7). Rather, it 
is the interaction between these two positions, each questionable in 
its own way, that seems to be moving the poem in a new direction.
The dialogue between Calidore and Meliboe is framed from the 
outset in terms of the former’s ulterior motives. Calidore has just laid 
eyes upon Meliboe’s adoptive daughter. He has already been welcomed 
into Meliboe’s house. His aim is to secure an invitation to join the 
pastoral community on a more permanent basis so that he can court 
Pastorella, and his discourse is therefore flagged as highly strategic 
throughout. At the start of the episode, we read that
[D]rawing thence his speach another way
[Calidore] Gan highly commend the happie life,
Which Shepheards lead[.]
     (6.9.18.7–9)
Later, Calidore is said to “insinuate” his desires (6.9.27.2). Is this cour-
tesy, we might wonder? Part of the interest of the dialogue, however, 
lies in trying to determine whether Meliboe is not an equally delib-
erate and calculating speaker. Notably, the topos that structures the 
dialogue—that of the desirability of pastoral retirement—is in a sense 
irrelevant to both participants, since for Calidore it functions as a mere 
pretext, whilst Meliboe ends up claiming that it is the mind alone that 
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determines happiness, not riches or (logically) location. This, then, is 
a dialogue without debate; or it might seem to be that. Throughout, 
the episode’s energies are focused elsewhere, beneath the surface of 
the conversation. Indirection is its governing principle.
Calidore praises the life of a shepherd. Here, he says, one leads
[A] life so free and fortunate,
From all the tempests of these worldly seas,
Which tosse the rest in daungerous disease[,]
that favorite image of Stoic and Neostoic writers (6.9.19.3–5).15 Meliboe 
agrees. “Great ones” (6.9.22.2) may be seduced by “the worlds gay 
shows” (6.9.22.1). In the country, however, care can never trouble 
“my minds vnmoued quiet” (6.9.22.7). Meliboe tells Calidore how he 
once served at the royal court, only to realize after ten years that he 
had spent his youth in vain. He returned to being a shepherd, and he 
now enjoys a life of leisure. This entirely conventional narrative leaves 
Calidore lost in “rauishment” (6.9.26.4)—at Meliboe’s wisdom, but also 
at his daughter’s beauty, described as the object of the knight’s “hungry 
eye” (6.9.26.7). And so Calidore expresses his desire to be “transposed” 
into the “low degree” of a shepherd. This prompts Meliboe’s declara-
tion that each should rest content with what he has, his assertion that 
the unmoved mind may dictate its own fortunes, and the conclusion 
that “fittest is, that all contented rest / With that they hold”—a barely-
concealed rebuke, in response to which Calidore just blandly restates 
the proposal that he should join the pastoral community:
Since then in each mans self (said Calidore)
It is, to fashion his owne lyfes estate,
Give me leaue awhyle, good father, in this shore
To rest my barcke[.]
     (6.9.31.1–4)
There is a finely calibrated interpersonal comedy in these exchanges. 
Calidore and Meliboe converse in subtly different modes: the one 
smoothly ingratiating; the other at first luxuriating and expansive 
(when describing the pastoral lifestyle), then clipped, aphoristic 
(when it becomes clear that Calidore may be more than just a passing 
visitor).16 But there is also a sense in which they don’t converse at all. 
Their discourse is threaded through with non-sequiturs and failures of 
engagement. Calidore, for instance, gives little sign of having deeply 
understood his host. He presently offers to pay Meliboe for his accom-
modation, a proposal that is scornfully rejected, and his interactions 
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with Meliboe seem largely superficial. When Calidore responds to 
Meliboe’s argument that “each vnto himself his life may fortunize,” he 
simply uses it as a jumping-off point from which to restate his earlier 
position. Meliboe, meanwhile, is equally evasive in his way. At 9.28, 
Calidore wishes that his fortunes might be “transposed.” This is not 
an explicit plea to be received into the pastoral community, but it is 
surely as good as one. To which, Meliboe declares:
In vaine [. . .] doe men
The heauens of their fortunes fault accuse,
Sith they know best, what is the best for them.
            (6.9.29.1–3)
It is not an outright rebuff. Meliboe never straightforwardly tells 
Calidore that he thinks his plan inappropriate, if that is what he does 
think. His habit of communicating through sententious set pieces means 
he can sidestep any direct acknowledgment of his guest’s desires. And 
so Calidore is obliged to ask for “leuve . . . To rest” with the shepherds: 
the open request that he seemed to have tried to avoid making previ-
ously (6.9.31.3–4). At such moments, the dialogue shades away from 
mutual incomprehension towards a kind of veiled confrontation. And 
were we tempted to see this dialogue as a too-simplistically conceived 
contest between smooth-talking Courtesy and rude but principled 
Constancy, we might reflect that Calidore displays his own intransi-
gence here. There is a version of the conversation in which Calidore 
plays the role of the unwelcome houseguest, and Meliboe the host too 
polite to say no. Calidore’s offer of money has generally been viewed 
as inept, but it aims to address precisely this reading of the situation.
At the conclusion of the dialogue, Meliboe welcomes Calidore to 
the community of poor shepherds. Characteristically, though, what he 
offers is not quite a welcome, or at least not an explicit one. Meliboe 
never actually gives the knight permission to stay. He simply refuses 
Calidore’s money, and says:
[I]f ye algates couet to assay
This simple sort of life, that shepheards lead,
Be it your owne: our rudenesse to your selfe aread.
         (6.9.33.7–9)
That is, very roughly: “go ahead—I can’t stop you.” “[R]udenesse” 
here means “uncouthness,” the pastoral lifestyle as opposed to the 
chivalric and courtly one. Yet elsewhere in book 6, Spenser’s use of 
the word shades towards its modern meaning. At the start of canto 
663Alex Davis
2, we read that the courteous knight or lady behaves in such a way 
“that none them rightly may reproue / Of rudenesse, for not yeelding 
what they owe” (6.2.1.7–8). Perhaps we might wonder just who is 
displaying “rudenesse” in the pastoral dialogue, Calidore or Meliboe. 
Calidore gets his way, and Meliboe has his say, but nothing is resolved 
here. These exchanges are finely poised on the uncertain borderland 
dividing the hospitable from the hostile.
It seems appropriate that what truly is at issue in this discussion 
should be Calidore’s problematic status as guest, and that Meliboe 
should in effect end up disavowing his role as host. In order to further 
draw out what might be at stake in the encounter between courtesy 
and constancy, I would like to turn to Gordon Teskey’s account of 
the former virtue, which describes it precisely as a kind of hospitable 
openness to difference. In Spenser, ideas are allegorically embodied as 
persons. “Thinking,” Teskey therefore argues, “is to be understood as 
an encounter . . . one moves into the presence of the unknown as if the 
unknown were not an object but rather another subject, a stranger”:
On this scene, accordingly, the metaphorical model for thought is no 
longer the grasping of a thing but the exercising of courtesy. Such 
courtesy does not take possession, nor does it invade the object to 
discover what it is in essence, so that a definition, an imposing of limits, 
can be formed. Courtesy invites a partial disclosure and opens itself in 
turn to attention from the other, showing a welcoming openness to the 
strange . . . it moves into nearness with the otherness of the stranger.17
For Teskey, as for the sixteenth-century nonconformist Robert Browne, 
“courtesie or ciuilitie is an humbling or abasing of our selues.”18 This 
sociable openness is fundamental to the way Spenser’s poem works: 
the thinking performed by The Faerie Queene is, in Teskey’s account, 
fluid, mobile, and endlessly self-correcting.
As a description of book 6 of The Faerie Queene, this might seem 
partial. Teskey’s argument develops solely out of an analysis of the 
Proem, and subsequent cantos seem less to illustrate the virtue of 
courtesy than to show it running awry. One can certainly see the logic. 
Throughout book 6, a high value is placed upon hospitality. Closed doors 
are burst open (see 6.1.22). Functionaries who turn away potential 
guests are mercilessly punished. Crudor’s porter is slain (see 6.1.23), 
as is Turpine’s rude groom (see 6.6.20–23). Yet as the narrative moves 
towards its conclusion, this ethic of openness seems on the point of 
turning itself inside out. When the hermit counsels Serena and Calepine 
always to talk in “open sight,” the advice is to remain above suspicion, 
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not to cultivate their generosity of spirit (6.6.14.8). By the end of 
the book, it is guileless Coridon who puts himself forward “openly” 
(6.9.43.5). Calidore, by way of contrast, is shown to be disingenuous 
in his dealings with Meliboe. Openness persists, therefore, but only 
in diminished form: only to the extent that the poem shows what its 
protagonist takes care to hide.
It is perhaps not surprising. Teskey’s account of courtesy commits 
that virtue to a state of perpetual disruption. In its stance of hospi-
table openness to change through encounter, Teskey’s courtesy is 
thought that (to quote Theodor Adorno) “takes as its most pressing 
business everything it cannot reach.”19 Courtesy is strenuous work, 
and its breakdown may be entirely comprehensible. Still, the essential 
perspicacity of Teskey’s account is suggested when we reflect that the 
ways in which courtesy goes wrong in book 6 seem to involve either 
an excess in, or a deficit of, the central dynamic he identifies. In one 
sense we have the suggestion that courtesy may be excessively labile 
and accommodating: simply too open——too environmental——to 
serve as an adequate ground of virtue. Calidore lies without hesita-
tion to Priscilla’s father in order to smooth over an awkward moment; 
Arthur initially spares the incorrigible Turpin; both Timias and Serena 
seem strangely vulnerable to the attacks of the Blatant Beast. Many 
of the book’s antagonists seem like aspects of the virtue it notionally 
celebrates. Vacuous Blandina entertains Arthur with “courteous glee” 
whilst the Blatant Beast represents less the denial of the values of 
a communal order than an alternative modality of their expression 
(slander, backbiting, and malice) (6.6.41.4). The introduction of the 
Savage Man seems to hint that courtesy is lacking in some necessary 
element of rigor or directness. At the same time, though, we increas-
ingly encounter versions of courtesy that seem tougher than they really 
ought to be, more calculating and instrumental. Calidore’s pastoral 
truancy is key here. His pursuit of Pastorella, his treatment of Meliboe 
and Coridon: each in turn hints at a hidden meanness at work within 
the acts of the knight of courtesy.20
Excessive accommodation on the one hand, veiled exploitation on 
the other: both are distortions of courtesy’s status as the hospitable 
virtue. Meliboe enters the scene as if conjured up by this impending 
disintegration of the ideal. For if courtesy represents an ethic of open-
ness, constancy is preeminently one of fixity and closure. Meliboe’s 
function thus seems to be less to check courtesy’s movement towards 
failure than to test out an alternative model of subjectivity. And yet, 
at the very moment of its introduction into the poem, constancy too 
begins to come undone.
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* * * * * *
De Constantia. Two Bookes of Constancie. The moral philosophie of 
the Stoicks. A Treatise of Constancie. Were one to open such a volume 
in 1590s London, one would immediately encounter thoughts resem-
bling those voiced by Meliboe. One would also encounter a worldview 
sharply at odds with everything implied by Teskey’s account of courtesy. 
Constancy, in its Neostoic variant at least, is the very antithesis of a 
hospitable virtue.
In its origins, Stoic philosophy emphasized the importance of accom-
modating oneself to a rational cosmic order. It argued that one single 
pneuma animated and unified the entire cosmos, producing a fluid 
system of mutual interconnection or sumpatheia.21 Such teaching seems 
fully compatible with the radical openness that Teskey describes.22 
As a system of practical ethics, however, Stoicism and Neostoicism 
promoted something very different. “A wise man,” Seneca writes, 
“can loose nothing: hee hath all his good inclosed in himselfe; hee no 
wayes putteth confidence in fortune; hee entirely possesseth his riches, 
contenting himselfe with vertue, which hath no neede of accidentall 
things, and therefore may neither increase nor decrease.”23 Self-
enclosure, absolute possession, defense against loss: Stoic psychology 
represents a systematically thought through disavowal of everything 
implied by Stoic physics and metaphysics.
One peculiarity of Stoic and Neostoic thinking is its combined 
emphasis upon a benign and rational cosmic order, alongside the 
advocacy of a psychic stance designed to fortify the self against 
the seemingly omnipresent threat of random disaster. The latter, 
it is acknowledged, cannot be avoided. However, one can control 
the controllables; and control is achieved through a constant effort 
directed towards the reduction of internal tension and the eradica-
tion of passionate commitment. For Lipsius, constancy is defined as 
“right and immoueable strength of the minde, neither lifted vp, nor 
pressed downe with externall or casuall accidents.”24 The ideal is one 
of dispassionate moderation and boundedness, the “immoueable” self 
as its own sole motive force. That thing not in one’s power? Du Vair 
recommends that one should say of it, “This thing toucheth not me 
at all, it concerns not me.”25 To the constant mind, externalities are 
irrelevances. In a telling formulation that crops up in a number of 
Stoic texts, they are described as “foreign.” Seneca’s epistle 41 wonders 
“what is more foolish then to praise that in a man which is forraine 
[aliena] to him?”26 In Chaucer’s translation of the Stoic-influenced 
Boethius, the “suffisaunce” that the wise man aspires towards is defined 
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as meaning never to be “nedy of foreyne help.”27 Strikingly, even in 
matters of logic the text favors reasoning that is “homliche knowen,” 
or analytically produced, over “reasons ytaken fro withouten.”28
Within and without; that which is mine and that which is not. 
Stoicism is a discourse of property and possession, one that takes the self 
as its primary object. The implications of this stance are contradictory. 
Even as Stoic writing advises the wise man to cultivate indifference to 
worldly goods, the language of ownership resurfaces in its descriptions 
of the constant subject. Grounded in a constant virtue, Seneca’s wise 
man “entirely possesseth his riches”; therefore he can lose nothing. 
Stoicism inculcates an extreme possessive individualism, to which the 
language of property ownership is fundamental. As G. W. F. Hegel was 
to argue some two centuries after Spenser, it responds to the threat of 
disempowerment and loss by reconstituting the self on the model of 
an object: a thing, differentiated from other things only by the fact of 
its inalienability.29 Hence the stereotyped view of the Stoic as insen-
sible and object-like, a mere “stock.” However inaccurate that cliché 
may be in the light of a nuanced account of the most evolved Stoic 
thinking, it is fully responsive to a very genuine strain of Stoic and 
Neostoic rhetoric.30 It would scarcely be an exaggeration to describe 
this as a phobic model of the self: constitutively embattled; infiltrated 
by a scorn of interdependence; constantly patrolling its own borders in 
order to assess its own vulnerability to loss. The Stoic cosmos may be 
woven together through sumpatheia; the emotional universe it depicts 
seems notably insular, costive, and constrained. These characteristics 
are if anything exaggerated in Stoicism’s early modern variants. The 
Seneca of the epistles is a comparatively mobile figure, often to be 
found in transit, changing locations or visiting the harbor; Lipsius’s 
De constantia simply opens with an argument against foreign travel.31
Yet we might also reflect that, by taking Stoicism at its word, such 
an account fails to catch hold of the hidden affects that motivate Stoic 
thought. If Stoicism is a language of possession, it is noticeably the case 
that its most significant object is real and not moveable property. Its 
buried aspiration is towards a place it can call its own. Stoic discourse is 
underpinned by an economy of topographical metaphors that mark off 
fundamental distinctions between inside and outside. Over and again, 
we are invited to imagine enclosed or bounded spaces, now tranquil 
and reclusive, now profoundly embattled. Chaucer’s Tale of Melibee, 
a source for Spenser’s Meliboe and a text full of allusions to Seneca, 
imagines the self as a house, into which the world, the flesh and the 
devil violently “cloumben.”32 In his Boece, the philosopher’s quest is 
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to discover a “perdurable seete.”33 Lipsius’s De constantia contains 
an encomium of gardens. “Philosophers and wise men,” we read 
“eschewing the cities and troublesom assembliees of people, contayned 
themselues within the bounds and limits of their gardens.”34 Like 
Chaucer’s houses and estates, Lipsius’s philosophical gardens function 
as external analogues for the constant mind as a space of psychic seclu-
sion. Meanwhile, Seneca’s treatise on constancy gives us an explicitly 
defensive variation on this theme. “Resolue thy selfe therefore Serenus,” 
it reads, “that this perfect man, full of vertues both diuine and humane, 
looseth nothing: his goods are enuironed with solide and impregnable 
ramparts, whereunto thou wouldest in some sort compare the walles 
of Babylon, vpon which Alexander mounted.”35 It was another popular 
image: du Vair’s account of The Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks argues 
that “as the passion cometh from without . . . so nature hath fenced 
vs within with a strong bulwarke or rampire to backe vs against the 
force hereof.”36 House, garden, citadel. These are not neutral spaces. 
They offer security and belonging: a home. They stand in a relation of 
antithesis to the flux and perpetual displacement represented by that 
other Stoic favorite, the sea. Impassive Stoicism thus grounds itself in 
the affectivity of possession. Passion may be imagined to come from 
without, but the business of being and belonging is itself saturated 
with otherwise impermissible feeling. What may have looked at first 
glance like a psychic structure devoted to the constant dampening 
and moderation of internal intensity in the service of a kind of reality 
principle can, upon further enquiry, be shown to be given over to 
the extraction of a hidden dividend of pleasure, drawn from its own 
inward resources.
* * * * * *
Throughout the dialogue between Calidore and Meliboe, Spenser 
presses on these key features of a constant selfhood, and in particular 
its topographical underpinnings. It is relevant that any educated early 
modern reader would have encountered Stoicism as an object of 
controversy and debate in the works of Cicero and others. The poem 
had previously shown itself to be skeptical: the proem to book 4 refers 
disparagingly to “Stoicke censours” who would like to repudiate the 
experience of love (4.proem.3.8–9). Meliboe, however, is a Stoic in 
the flesh. He is a sketch—compact, but vivid and penetrating—of a 
constant subjectivity.
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The presentation of Meliboe is ostensibly positive. The narrator 
quite straightforwardly describes him as a “good old man” (6.9.16.1). 
In the past, Meliboe has acted hospitably, taking the foundling 
Pastorella—discovered in the “open fields”—as his adoptive daughter 
(6.9.14.6). He also invites Calidore to spend the night in his cottage 
(see 6.9.16.4). Nonetheless, many recent critical accounts of Meliboe 
have been suspicious of or even hostile toward him.37 As the canto 
develops, we note, he seems progressively less welcoming, ever more 
a focal point for skepticism and uncertainty. The pastoral dialogue 
offers him the opportunity to air his philosophy of life. To be “constant” 
is, etymologically, to stand together; but not here. Meliboe disdains 
“forreine helps to lifes due nourishment” (6.9.20.7). Fractional tonal 
cues give the lie to the constant subject’s sense of his own imperturb-
ability. “I doe not any one enuy,” Meliboe claims, “Nor am enuyed of 
any one therefore” (6.9.21.1–2). The bare assertion of independence 
is inflected by the telling assumption that relation could only ever be 
invidious. Professions of self-sufficiency hint at anxieties over vulner-
ability. “They that haue much, feare much to loose thereby,” Meliboe 
comments (6.9.21.3).
Meliboe declares that “[I] doe my self, with that I haue, content”—
and what he has is, primarily, his self; nothing else should matter 
(6.9.20.5). It does, though. Spenser’s pastoral dialogue latches onto 
Stoicism’s engagement with questions of ownership, and opens them 
out to view. It is the holding of land in particular that offers the model 
for the bounded subject here, and it is on this point that the constant 
self is most inadvertently revealing, as the desire for secure possession 
begins to overspill its self-imposed limits. The pastoral landscape of 
canto 9 is a patchwork of independent smallholdings, situated within 
common ground. Each shepherd grazes his “seuerall” sheep in the 
“open fields,” then retires to his home at the end of the day (6.9.15.4, 
4.1). Within this community, Meliboe wants only to own his “small 
plot,” not beholden to anyone (6.9.28.4). Here in the countryside, “all 
the night in siluer sleepe I spend, / And all the day, to what I list, I doe 
attend” (6.9.22.1, 8–9). Sometimes Meliboe hunts the fox, sometimes 
he fishes, and when he is tired he rests in the shade or by the river. 
Just as in Stoic philosophy, description of the self modulates into the 
description of a place. But the pastoral world can never—cannot even 
in an allegory such as Spenser’s—perfectly represent Meliboe’s constant 
selfhood, precisely because it is an external environment, such as he 
ought to regard with complete indifference. In principle, one location 
should be as good as another for Meliboe, just as wealth and riches are 
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one. In practice, he seems just a touch too satisfied with the constant 
lifestyle he has achieved—a little too invested in its qualities as a place. 
The syntactical clarity and assurance that blocks out the stanzaic form 
of canto 9, stanza 30 with which this discussion began—from the 
first statement of Meliboe’s theme, through successive and opposed 
examples, to its emphatic restatement—withers away under scrutiny. 
Why should poverty be actively preferred to riches, if wisdom is the 
only true wealth? Meliboe’s discourse shifts disconcertingly between 
an austere, maxim-heavy, generalizing style, and an idyllic voice that 
celebrates the undemanding pleasures of the pastoral landscape. This 
tonal schizophrenia is central to Spenser’s presentation of him: there 
is just no way that Meliboe’s luxuriant encomia of rural life can be 
fully compatible with the declaration that “It is the mynd, that maketh 
good or ill.” For the truly constant, Stoic subject, location should be, 
literally, neither here nor there. Meliboe’s unmoved happiness thus 
rests, just a shade too obviously, on his enjoyment of a pastoral estate. 
His assumptions about the mind’s invulnerability are underwritten by 
his status as a smallholder.
Meliboe’s thought is pocketed with discontinuities of this sort. He 
scorns those “which fortunes doe by vowes deuize” (6.9.30.8). To 
“deuize” might be to design or plan. It can also mean to bequeath in 
a last will and testament; Meliboe condemns the rich man “that hath 
abundance at his will” (6.9.30.3). Yet earlier he had declared that having 
experienced life at court: “I from thenceforth haue learn’d to loue 
more deare / This lowly quiet life, which I inherite here” (6.9.25.8–9, 
emphasis added). When operating in Neostoic mode, Meliboe has 
nothing but scorn for riches and inheritance. When he speaks of his 
own estate, they are reconfigured as positives. Calidore cunningly 
mirrors this structure of bad faith when he praises “this small plot 
of your dominion” (6.9.28.4) as preferable to any degree of “great 
Lordship and ambition” (6.9.28.5). Are “dominion” and “Lordship” 
really so very radically opposed? Can size alone mark off a significant 
distinction between them? Meliboe exercises his “dominion” over 
a pastoral landscape that is sleepy and undemanding, that requires 
nothing of him “but onely to attend it” (6.9.21.6). The verb means 
“to tend,” referring to sheep, but hints at an image of Meliboe as the 
complacent spectator of his own constant lifestyle. Meanwhile, the way 
his language weaves him into structures of property and possession 
that he has notionally rejected suggests the fragility of his claims to 
independence. In the end, “Hauing small” is not really distinct from 
any other kind of “[h]auing” (6.9.20.3).
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A number of recent philosophical works have sought to articu-
late models of identity that are in various ways open to otherness 
and difference and that challenge the assumptions about individual 
autonomy and self-possession that underpin contemporary political and 
economic discourse. Judith Butler and Athena Athansiou, for instance, 
seek to explore a “dispossessed” subjectivity capable of reimagining 
inherited regimes of property ownership and sovereignty. Their target 
is a possessive individualism grounded in “the ontological conflation 
of the individual with property ownership.”38 There is a disconcerting 
moment in the pastoral dialogue when it looks as though Spenser’s poem 
is about to stage this maneuver in reverse—as if, in the genealogy of 
political forms, courtesy’s radical openness were the discarded ancestor 
of a possessive individualism and not a transformative possibility that 
lies beyond it.39 In the end, though, this is not quite what happens. 
Notable studies of early modern literature by the likes of Joseph 
Campana and James Kuzner have if anything pursued the opposite 
argument: Kuzner, for instance, claims that Spenser can be aligned 
with a tradition in which “selfhood is defined by boundaries that do not 
hold, by a vulnerability to others that undercuts self-control”—the very 
vulnerability that Stoic psychology seeks to eradicate.40 To the extent 
that book 6 seems to offer a veiled satire on Meliboe as a constant 
subject, The Faerie Queene might be described as an anti-Stoic poem.41 
Yet there is no bare opposition between courtesy and constancy here. 
Instead, they begin to change places. As we move through the pastoral 
dialogue, courtesy looks increasingly steely and intransigent; constancy, 
ever so slightly embattled and helpless, obliged to endure what it 
cannot change. Meliboe’s central claim is that the mind “fortunize[s]” 
for itself, unaffected by external accidents. This assertion of invulner-
ability is swiftly contradicted by events. In the succeeding cantos of 
the poem he is abducted by pirates and casually put to death. “Old 
Meliboe,” we read, “is slaine”: no more of him (6.11.18.4). Strictly 
speaking, there is no contradiction. Death and disaster would count 
among those circumstances against which a Stoic might claim to be 
fortified by his philosophy. But in a poem such as The Faerie Queene, 
no fates are random or accidental; all bear some sort of significance. 
We are confronted with the suggestion that the bounded self may self-
defeatingly invite precarity and encroachment, somehow soliciting the 
externalities it resists. What Sigmund Freud called the “principle of 
constancy,” narrowly focused upon its own psychic homeostasis and 
the reduction of unpleasurable internal tension, seems ultimately to 
tend towards the absolute quiescence of death.42
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The opening move in the poem’s development towards a projected 
seventh book is thus not to illustrate a constant virtue but to provide 
a critique of it. Many accounts of the legend of Courtesy see it, if not 
as a formal conclusion to the poem, then at least as running aground 
in fatal doubts and uncertainties that produce a kind of thematic 
finality. Richard Neuse, for instance, writes that “by the end of Book 
VI the Beast is triumphant and even threatens to disengage itself 
from the fiction.” “Is this not,” he asks, “the poet’s final acknowledge-
ment that his quest, though unfinished, has reached the limits of his 
epic enterprise?”43 What we see in the pastoral dialogue, I argue, is a 
possible counter-movement of emergence. Plainly, Meliboe does not 
represent the poem’s final word on a constant virtue. Rather, he opens 
out a new arena of thought. And, running alongside this preliminary 
exploration of the values of constancy, we have a revision of the terms 
upon which the poem understands finitude and limitation. The first 
three books of The Faerie Queene had grounded finality in agonistic 
structures: book 1 ends when the dragon is defeated, book 2 when 
Acrasia is captured, and book 3 with Busirane’s overthrow. The 1596 
Faerie Queene increasingly finds itself interested in how virtues break 
down, or encounter intractable problems, or experience a nagging sense 
of the lack of fit between what they were meant to be and what they 
end up becoming. Reading Meliboe’s fatally “vnmoved” subjectivity as 
a preliminary maneuver within a larger transition towards a projected 
“Legend of Constancie” is consistent with this developing interest in 
deriving a kind of progress—a forward movement—from failure and 
imperfection.
* * * * * *
The pastoral dialogue between Calidore and Meliboe represents 
one version of the relationship between the virtues of courtesy and 
constancy. Their encounter is complex and mobile. It opens out future 
directions of enquiry, rather than leaving its protagonists in static 
opposition. It also offers us one possible version of what the task of a 
seventh Book of The Faerie Queene might be: namely, to set constancy 
into motion, to open it out and to endow it with something of the 
hospitable openness to difference that had characterized courtesy.
This is what The Mutabilitie Cantos try to do. They represent a 
gesture of incorporation and recognition, not of rejection; the latter 
would simply reproduce the phobic psychic economy already held up 
for scrutiny in book 6. It is true that Mutabilitie’s claim for universal 
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rule is dismissed. But Nature’s judgment concedes her an extraordi-
nary amount—almost everything, in fact. By the end of the Cantos, 
Mutabilitie’s sway over “all things” has been decisively established 
(7.7.58.2). The work of The Mutabilitie Cantos, then, is to try to find 
ways of thinking through dissolution and change without being crippled 
by them. It is to remain constant without becoming either closed or 
brittle. As is often noted, the Cantos feature no direct representative 
of a constant virtue. Jove seems too compromised to perform that role, 
Nature too enigmatic and remote. Yet the startling transition performed 
by the two-stanza, “vnperfite” fragment following canto 7—out of 
mythological narrative and into a plangent first-person voice—indicates 
the deeply individual stakes of this project (7.8.title).
One effect of this movement of thought is to highlight the ambiva-
lence and complexity latent in claims to completion. To the extent that 
it could be said to represent an ending, the resolution reached at the 
end of The Mutabilitie Cantos is achieved through a movement back-
wards, via a return to the discourses of property and land ownership 
woven throughout Stoic writing on constancy and problematized in 
the pastoral dialogue in book 6. Both book 6 and The Faerie Queene 
and The Mutabilitie Cantos might be described as essays in the 
metaphysics of social order. They are an expression of what E. M. 
W. Tillyard famously called “The Elizabethan World Picture”: that is, 
the attempt to project contingent social arrangements onto the fabric 
of the universe.44 Notably, however, what Tillyard described as stable 
doxa emerges in Spenser as anxiety. Book 6 had worried away at the 
relationship between the virtue of courtesy, allegedly “deriu’d . . . From 
heauenly seedes,” and contemporary social structures (6.Proem.3.6–7). 
The Mutabilitie Cantos, meanwhile, process metaphysics through an 
inheritance narrative.
Initially in the Mutabilitie Cantos, Mutabilitie’s bid for cosmic 
supremacy is experienced as an assault upon value as such, an anarchic 
attempt to liquidate all hierarchy and structure. Yet this attempted coup 
d’état by the forces of universal chaos is justified in the most conser-
vative and (for a romance) normative terms: inheritance. Mutabilitie, 
who defies all laws, advances a legal claim to possession. “I greater 
am in bloud,” she declares, “Then all the Gods, though wrongfully 
from heauen exil’d” (7.6.26.8–9). As many commentators note, this 
claim is quietly dropped when Mutabilitie confronts Jove and makes 
her case before Nature. Jove insists that he rules by right of conquest, 
not heredity, and Mutabilitie ends up seeking to demonstrate her de 
facto dominion over the world, not her genealogical priority.45 Less 
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often noticed is the fact that the language of inheritance resurfaces in 
Nature’s response to Mutabilitie’s plea, where it is deployed to resolve 
the competing claims of stability and change. After Mutability has 
spoken, Nature delivers her judgment:
I well consider all that ye haue sayd,
And find that all things stedfastnes doe hate
And changed be: yet being rightyly wayd
They are not changed from their first estate;
But by their change their being doe dilate:
And turning to themselues at length againe,
Do work their owne perfection so by fate[.]
            (7.7.58)
Earlier, we read of Nature’s “good estate” (7.6.5.3). Here, Nature speaks 
of the “first estate” of things. The Longman Spenser glosses the words 
as meaning an “original (unfallen) state,” and this is indeed how the 
phrase was most often used in early modern culture. Countless books 
from this period make reference to a “first estate” as something that 
can be forsaken, degenerated from, lost or maintained. It represents 
a fixed point from which assessments of value can be made. Spenser, 
however, does something more complex with the idea, in part by fully 
activating its legal resonances. Particularly in the Stoic tradition of 
thinking about constancy, “estate” carries territorial and proprietary 
connotations.46 The Cantos have already referred to Jove’s “principall 
Estate,” meaning his throne or dominion (7.6.19.4). Meanwhile, 
although “first estate” was not quite a legal term of art, it was often 
used in law treatises with reference to cases in which land had been 
granted or leased to a second holder. When the property reverts to 
its original possessor, it returns to its first estate. In Christopher Saint 
Germain’s Fyrst Dialogue, we read that where land is granted upon 
condition, the original owner may re-enter into possession if that condi-
tion is not met. In such cases, “it is lawfull by the lawe of Englade for 
the feffoure to reentre & to take his lande agayn & to holde it as in his 
fyrst estate.”47 Similarly, in Edward Coke’s commentary on Littleton, 
when an estate is recovered for breach of condition, “he that entreth 
for a condition broken shall be seised in his first estate.”48 These are 
treatises that analyse the often extraordinarily complex movements 
of property and title in early modern society, trying to reduce them 
to order. “First estate” attempts to distinguish between a heritable 
possession, and one granted or contracted for a limited period of 
time. As it figures in Nature’s argument, it represents the promise of 
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an underlying continuity of possession. All things shift and blur, yet 
all shall return to themselves “at length.” The implication, however, is 
that stability must emerge out of change, rather than merely setting 
itself in opposition to it. The language of landholding, which we might 
ordinarily associate with assertions of continuity and enduring value, 
in this instance surprisingly provides the model for a form of subjec-
tivity that is open to dispossession. Inheritance and the transmission 
of title emerge, not just as a challenge to the rule of Jove and the 
claims of metaphysics, but as ways of thinking through the structure 
of a constant virtue.49
Constancy, for Spenser, is about where you stand. It always has the 
potential to emerge in a territorial register. “First estate” permits the 
poem to imagine incessant change as part of a trajectory that maps a 
return to an earlier state of affairs, and The Mutabilitie Cantos embed 
this claim within their own structure of recapitulations or returns, both 
of earlier material in The Faerie Queene, and of texts that The Faerie 
Queene adapts, all of which anticipate Nature’s arguments. Thus, in 
book 3, Adonis was said to persist, “eterne in mutabilitie, / . . . by 
succession made perpetuall” (3.6.47.5–6). “Succession,” here, is both 
sequence in the abstract, and the transmission of a title or property; 
in book 2, Oberon ensures that Tanaquil will “succeede” him, “by his 
last will” (2.10.76.5). A perpetuity, meanwhile, was an estate with a 
restriction on its future alienation. John Doddridge describes it as “an 
Entayle with an addition of a Proviso Conditionall tyed to his Estate, 
not to put away the Land from his next heyre.”50 Adonis succeeds 
himself, forever; no one else can. And this earlier moment in the poem 
in turn houses its own returns to medieval antecedents, themselves 
often marked by Stoic thought. The distinction between the “eterne” 
and the “perpetuel,” for instance, can be found in Chaucer’s Boece, 
whilst in The Knight’s Tale we read:
[S]peces of thynges and progressiouns
Shullen enduren by successiouns,
And nat eterne, withouten any lye.51
Nothing, in short, should surprise us about the conclusion of The 
Mutabilitie Cantos. If Nature’s arguments possess the force of an 
imaginative coup, it is not because they say anything very new. On 
the contrary: they sound oddly familiar. “First estate” brings with it 
a sense of déjà vu. It takes its place within a structure of allusions in 
which the language of inheritance features as a thread of continuity, 
but also, through the poem’s repeated recourse to it, as a reminder of 
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the impossibility of ever achieving a position of security and firm “sted-
fastnes.” Like some sixteenth-century version of Freud’s Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, The Mutabilitie Cantos’ reflections upon a psychic 
economy devoted to a norm of constancy find expression through a 
narrative rhythm of returns to an earlier state of things. They them-
selves perform that simultaneous journey towards, and deferral of, the 
moment of completion that is their most profound subject matter.52 
Thus the poem keeps itself productively off-balance.
Nature’s judgment is that Mutabilitie rules all—for now. A return 
to stability is promised, but also indefinitely postponed. And yet, 
The Mutabilitie Cantos don’t feel entirely bleak or desolate—in part, 
perhaps, because of the way they have digested the fact of change, 
which features by now less as an external accident than as an aspect 
of the poem’s own internal resources. The concluding prayer thus 
finds a voice capable of acknowledging its vulnerability, of bemoaning 
temporality without being entirely destroyed by it. We might reflect 
that for Spenser’s (and Lodge’s) schoolmaster Richard Mulcaster, 
constancy seems primarily to have been just this, a matter of perse-
verance, not immutability. His Positions speak of the “constancie to 
continew and not to shrinke”; of “constancie in perfourming”; and of 
“constancie to continue the best.”53 The melancholic patterning of 
The Mutabilitie Cantos might seem to produce a subjectivity that is 
meager or hollowed out, yet there is something here that is generative, 
such as finds its analogue in the vibrant celebration of material and 
creaturely multifariousness that dominates Mutabilitie’s plea before 
Nature, threatening to overspill the bounds of the Cantos’ ostensible 
didactic intent.
The aim was to lend constancy some of the openness and flexibility 
that it was seen to lack in the pastoral dialogue in book 6; to render it 
capable of responsive engagement with a world in which all is “vnper-
fite”: non-ideal, and as-yet, or never, to be completed. In the process 
The Mutabilitie Cantos substantiate the suggestion earlier made in 
relation to Meliboe. Truly to achieve a state of “vnmoved quiet” is 
now, quite clearly, to be dead; the “vnperfite” prayer that concludes 
the Cantos more or less admits as much. Here we get a fully articu-
lated alternative to the agonistic model of narrative, in which success 
is achieved through the death of the other. We get a way of making 
dissolution and failure productive. With inheritance standing both 
for the stability of an abiding state and for the ceaseless shiftings of 
possession, The Mutabilitie Cantos offer a return to the too-facile 
observation of that failed exemplar of a constant virtue, Meliboe, now 
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reframed in a genuinely interrogative mood: what is it, “this . . . life, 
which I inherite here”? (6.9.25.9)
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